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MICHAEL C.W. HESS,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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Respondents and Appellees.
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Michael Hess appeals the trial court's decision to affirm the suspension of his
driver's license. The issue presented on this appeal deal with the de novo trial only as
to the service and the commencement of the division's action (as required by Utah
Code Ann. § 53-3-223(3)-(6)) as contemplated by the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act, 63-46b-l et seq. The trial court's erroneous conclusion and application of Utah
Law was plain error of which this court should review de novo.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(j)
(1953, as amended) (appeals transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court). Mr. Hess appeals the final order and judgment of the Second District Court, in
and for Davis County involving the judicial review of an informal administrative
hearing.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
(1) Whether the trial erroneously declared the commencement of a driver
license division action is exempted as an emergency proceeding pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-20.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(1)

The commencement of a driver license action is commenced by

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3; not § 63-46b-20.
We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness giving no
deference to the trial court's interpretation. Ward v. Richfield City. 798 P.2d
757, 759 (Utah 1990). See also Chris & Dick's Lumber v. State Tax Comm'n.
791 P.2d 511, 513-14 (Utah 1990) (interpretation of statute or rule is generally
accorded no deference on appeal).
Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); also Hercules. Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n. 877 P.2d 133 (Utah 1994).
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
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[Included in Appendix. (App. 1-8)]
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3 (2001)

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-20 (2001)

Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 (2001)

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.1 (2001)

Utah Adm. Code R708-14-6

STATEMENTS OF FACT FOR THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case:
This is an appeal from a de novo appeal of the Second Judicial District

Court affirming the driver's license division suspending Mr. Hess's driving privilege.
Mr. H e s s was deprived of the statutory right to a proceeding commenced under
Section 63-46b-3 (neither the State issued a notice of agency action, nor did Mr. Hess
request for an action by the division). Meanwhile, the facts underlying the arrest for
Driving Under the Influence were stipulated between the parties. (App. 14)1
II.

Course of the Proceedings:
The parties conducted a de novo trial on May 8, 2001 ? During the trial

1

Mr. Hess is required to reference to an appendix form of record. The trial court
refused to allow Mr. Oliver to check out the record for the purpose of the appeal. (See trial
court docket-Appendix 11). He has elected to brief with this form of reference to the record
to avoid destroying his reputation with the trial judge that seeking an order compelling the
release would have caused if counsel pursued the matter before this court.
2

A complete transcript of the de novo trial is included in the record and is cited as
(App. 12-30).
3

the court heard arguments relevant to the commencement of the division's action alone.
The parties stipulated to the facts of the underlying arrest. (App. 14) and the parties
stipulated to the service of the DUI Summons and Citation. (App. 31). The citation is
issued by the arresting officer; not a presiding officer. (App. 31).
During the de novo trial, Mr. Oliver argued that the driver license action was
wrongfully commenced. (App. 17-20). He argued that in order to comply with the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter, the "UAPA"), the division would
have to comply with Section 63-46b-3 to be commenced properly (App. 6). The judge
took the time to review the UAPA and then argued with counsel that the
commencement was pursuant to Section 63-46b-20 (concerning emergency
proceedings). (App. 20-24). The trial court's arguments were clearly erroneous, (app.
20), but since he's the judge Mr. Oliver's arguments fell on deaf ears. Thus, this
appeal. The court took the matter under advisement then later issued it's decision by
memorandum decision. (See App. 32-36).
III.

Disposition in Trial Court:
The trial court affirmed the division's action against Mr. Hess. The

license was to remain suspended pursuant to the Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law
And Order. (App. 32-36).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 (1953, as amended) and Utah
4

Code Ann. § 41-6-44.1 (1953, as amended), Utah Law requires the arresting officer to
provide personal service upon a person suspected of driving under the influence of
alcohol, and it mandates that division to follow Title 63, Chapter 46b of the UAPA.
These provisions are in conflict with each other. The Utah Administrative Code,
pursuant to R708-14-6 clarifies that the division must follow Section 63-46b-3 when
commencing its action. The person service by the officer under Section 53-3-223 does
not accomplish the requirements of Section 63-46b-3. This question was presented to
the trial judge, and the court avoided the decision by claiming an exemption under
Section 63-46b-20. This error by the court was clearly erroneous pursuant to R70-814-6.
ARGUMENT
POINT,
THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED ERRONEOUSLY THAT A DRIVERS
LICENSE ACTION IS COMMENCED UNDER SECTION 63-46b-20 RATHER
THAN AS REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 63-46b-3 AS REQUIRED BY LAW,
A. Introduction,
The U.S. Constitution expressly provides, in pertinent part, "No person
shall be held to answer . . . nor shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ." U.S. Const, amend. V. Moreover "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; not shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
5

protection of the laws." [7.5. Const, amend. XIV § 1.
The Utah State Constitution expressly provides, "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah Const, art. I, §
7. And "no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party." Utah
Const, art. I, § 11. Finally, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation." Utah Const, art. I, § 24.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah
1983), articulated the standards regarding due process, stating, inter alia:
"Due process" is not a technical concept that can be reduced to a formula with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Rather, "the demands
of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand a
procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved." Rupp v.
Grantsville City. Utah, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (1980).
Id. In this case, it is quite clear that by denying Mr. Hess's rights were affected by the
division and affirmed by the trial judge as it pertained to his right to locomotion (his
driver's license privilege).
B. The Deprivation of Right Outside Of Due Process.
In this matter, Mr. Hess contends that he was deprived of his driving
privilege outside of the due course of law. In the State of Utah, the Legislature has
established the means in which due process rights of drivers are to be administered
when the division desired to suspend, revoke, cancel, or disqualify (hereinafter,
6

"suspend" only) for suspicion of driving under the influence. These procedures were
outlined in Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44.1; 53-3-223; 63-46b-3; and R708-14-6 of the
Utah Administrative Code.
In this matter, the division failed to follow these provisions as they clearly
read. When the division desires to suspend a driver's license, the division must either
act on the request of the intended party or upon notice by the division. Pursuant to
Section 63-46-3, proper notice is accomplished by including, inter alia:
(A).

The Notice must be signed by a presiding officer.

(B).

The Names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice is being
given by the presiding officer, including the driver.

(C).

The agency's "file number", the file number for the Division is not the
Citation Number. It is the D.L. number however, the Notice does provide
clear understanding.

(D).

The name of the adjudicative proceeding.

(E).

A statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be conducted
informally according to the provisions of rules adopted under Sections
63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or formally according to the provisions of
Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-l 1.

(F).

If the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that each
respondent must file a written response within 30 days of the mailing date
of the notice of agency action.

7

(G).

If the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal or if a hearing is required b>
statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any scheduled hearing,
a statement of the purpose for which the hearing is to be held, and a
statement that a party who fails to attend or participate in the hearing maybe held in default.

(H).

A statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the
adjudicative proceeding is to be maintained.

(I).

The name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the presiding
officer.

In this matter, the DUI Summons and Citation fails to provide any of these requirements.
(App. 31). The citation is signed by the arresting officer, not a presiding officer. The
notice fails to include the names and addresses of witnesses and other parties to be
included in the notice. In order to comply with the UAPA, the division should just
automatically set a hearing and provide the accused with notice of the action and of any
hearings. Instead, the Summons requires a party to request a hearing. Why should the
accused request a hearing? It is not his desire to commence an action against his own
civil liberties. If it is the division which desires to suspend, the division must comply
with Section 63-46b-3 as required by R708-14-6. In this matter, the division failed to do
so, rather the division summarily took action against Mr. Hess, without the benefit of a
hearing, as required by the UAPA-the sustantive authority which empowers the division
to exercise the power to suspend.
8

As a result of the deficiency, and in view of the substantial policy error the
division exercises against the citizens and guests of the State of Utah, Mr. Hess appealed
the decision to the Second District Court. The trial judge in the Second District Court,
erroneous applied the law during the May 18, 2001 trial de novo. Instead of following the
law pursuant to Section 63-46b-3 and R708-14-6, the court elected to argue with Mr.
Hess that Section 63-46b-20 applied. The judge's philosophy was that the division's
policy must have that the circumstances call for the matter to be treated as an emergency.
The judges decision should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
In this matter, the trial court condoned the division's deprivation of Mr.
Hess's right to operate a motor vehicle. The trial court condoned the division's action
contrary to the established substantive due process as provided by the law. Therefore,
this Court should reverse the trial court's decision and its September 5, 2001 order.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of
April, 2002.
D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Petitioner and Appellant

9

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, postage prepaid, to: Rebecca D. Waldron, State Agency
Counsel Division, 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 140857, Salt Lake City, Utah 841140857.
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2002.
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APPENDICES

which a license was. pre\iousl> suspended under Section
53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was
based on the same occurrence upon which the record of
conviction is based
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this
section, a court may order the operator's license of a
person who is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) to
be suspended or revoked for an additional penod of 90
days, 180 days, or one year to remove from the highways
those persons who have shown they are safety hazards
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license
under this Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and
send to the Driver License Division an order to suspend or
revoke that person's driving privileges for a specified
period of time
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate m home
confinement through the use of electronic monitoring, the
electronic monitonng shall alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law enforcement
units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require
d) the person to wear an electronic monitonng
device at all times,
(11) that a device be placed in the home or other
specified location of the person, so that the person's
compliance with the court's order may be monitored,
and
(m) the person to pay the costs of the electronic
monitoring
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described m Subsection (13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install electronic monitonng equipment m the residence of the person or other
specified location
(d) The court may
d) require the person's electronic home monitonng
device to include a substance abuse testing instrument,
(n) restnct the amount of alcohol the person may
consume dunng the time the person is subject to
home confinement,
(ui) set specific time and location conditions that
allow the person to attend school educational classes,
or employment and to travel directly between those
activities and the person's home, and
dv) waive all or part of the costs associated with
home confinement if the person is determined to be
indigent by the court
(e) The electronic monitonng descnbed in this section
may either be administered directly bv the appropnate
corrections agency, probation monitoring agency, or by
contract with a pnvate provider
(f) The electronic monitonng provider shall cover the
costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (13)(c)(iv)
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e)
d) the court shall specify the period of the probation,
(n) the person shall pay all of the costs of the
probation, and
(m) the court may order any other conditions of the
probation
(b) The court shall provide the probation descnbed in
this section by contract with a probation monitonng
agency or a pnvate probation provider
(c) The probation provider descnbed in Subsection (b)
shall monitor the person's compliance with all conditions

of the persons sentence, condition of probation and
court orders received under this article and shall notify
the court of anv failure to comply with or complete that
sentence or those conditions or orders
(d) d) The court may waive all or part of the costs
associated with probation if the person is determined
to be indigent by the court
(u) The probation provider descnbed m Subsection
(14)(b) shall cover the costs of waivers by the court
under Subsection (14)(dXi)
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2)
and there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood
alcohol level of 16 or higher, then if the court does not order
(a) treatment as descnbed under Subsection (4Xd)
(5Xd), or (6)(b)(ui), then the court shall enter the reasons
on the record, and
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the
reasons on the record
d) t h e installation of an ignition interlock system
as a condition of probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44 7, or
(n) the imposition of home confinement through
the use of electronic monitonng in accordance with
Subsection (13)
2000

41-6-44.1. Procedures — Adjudicative proceedings.
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with the
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its
adjudicative proceedings
1987
41-6-44.2.

Repealed.

1983

41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis —
Evidence.
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety
shall establish standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath, including
standards of training
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is matenal to
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or
operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutonly
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of
acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made
and the instrument used was accurate, according to standards
established in Subsection (1), are admissible if
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular
course of the investigation at or about the time of the act,
condition, or event, and
(b) the source of information from which made and the
method and circumstances of their preparation mdicate
their trustworthiness
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid and
further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary
1987
41-6-44.4.

R e n u m b e r e d a s § 53-3-231.

1996

41-6-44.5.

Admissibility of chemical t e s t r e s u l t s in ac-

tions for driving under the influence —
Weight of evidence.
(1) (a) In any civil or cnminal action or proceeding in which
it is matenal to prove that a person was operating or in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath
alcohol content statutonly prohibited, the results of a
chemical test or tests as authonzed in Section 41-6-44 10
are admissible as evidence

5\PP. 1
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(h) U) "Presiding officer" means an agency head, or an
individual or body of individuals designated by the
agency head, by the agency's rules, or by statute to
conduct an adjudicative proceeding
(n) If fairness to the parties is not compromised, an
agency may substitute one presiding officer for another during any proceeding
(in) A person who acts as a presiding officer at one
phase of a proceeding need not continue as presiding
officer through all phases of a proceeding
(1) "Respondent" means a person against whom an
adjudicative proceeding is initiated, whether by an agency
or any other person
(j) "Superior agency" means an agency required or
authorized by law to review the orders of another agency
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from designating DV r u ^ e the names or titles of the agency head or the
presiding officers with responsibility for adjudicative proceedings before the agency
1988
63~46b-3.

C o m m e n c e m e n t of a d j u d i c a t i v e proceedings.
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20, all
adjudicative proceedings shall be commenced by either
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are commenced by the agency, or
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are
commenced by persons other than the agency
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served
according to the following requirements
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing,
signed by a presiding officer, and shall include
d) the names and mailing addresses of all persons
to whom notice is being given by the presiding officer,
and the name, title, and mailing address of any
attorney or employee who has been designated to
appear for the agency,
(n) the agency's file number or other reference
number,
(in) the name of the adjudicative proceeding,
Civ) the date that the notice of agency action was
mailed,
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be conducted informally according to the
provisions of rules adopted under Sections 63-46b-4
and 63-46D-5, or formally according to the provisions
of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll,
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a
statement that each respondent must file a w n t t e n
response within 30 days of the mailing date of the
notice of agency action,
(vn) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal,
or if a hearing is required by statute or rule, a
statement of the time and place of any scheduled
hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the
hearing is to be held, and a statement that a party
who fails to attend or participate in the hearing may
be held in default,
(vin) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a h e a n n g is required by statute or rule, or if
a h e a n n g is permitted by rule and may be requested
by a party within the time prescribed by rule, a
statement that the parties may request a hearing
within the time provided by the agency's rules,
dx) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the adjudicative proceeding is to be
maintained,
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and telephone
number of the presiding officer, and

63-46b-3

(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicame
proceeding and, to the extent known bv the prebiding
officer, the questions to be decided
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by
the agency, the agency shall
(0 mail the notice of agency action to each party,
(n) publish the notice of agency action, if required
by statute, and
(in) mail the notice of agency action to any other
person who h a s a right to notice under statute or rule
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency permits
persons other than the agency to initiate adjudicative
proceedings, t h a t person's request for agency action shall
be in writing and signed by the person invoking the
jurisdiction of the agency, or by that person's representative, and shall include
d) the names and addresses of all persons to whom
a copy of the request for agency action is being sent,
(in) the agency's file number or other reference
number, if known,
(m) the date that the request for agency action was
mailed,
(iv) a statement of the legal authonty and jurisdiction under which agency action is requested,
(v) a statement of the relief or action sought from
the agency, and
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons forming
the basis for relief or agency action
(b) The person requesting agency action shall file the
request with the agency and shall mail a copy to each
person known to have a direct interest in the requested
agency action
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or more forms
eliciting the information required by Subsection (3)(a) to
serve as the request for agency action when completed
and filed by the person requesting agency action
(d) The presiding officer shall promptly review a request for agency action and shall
(i) notify the requesting party in writing that the
request is granted and that the adjudicative proceeding is completed,
(u) notify the requesting party in writing that the
request is denied and, if the proceeding is a formal
adjudicative proceeding, that the party may request a
h e a n n g before the agency to challenge the denial, or
(m) notify the requesting party that further proceedings are required to determine the agency's response to the request
(e) d) Any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(n) shall
contain the information required by Subsection 6346b-5(l)(i) in addition to disclosure required by Subsection (3)(dXn)
(u) The agency shall mail any notice required by
Subsection (3)(d) to all parties, except that any notice
required by Subsection (3)(d)(m) may be published
when publication is required by statute
(ill; The notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(m)
shall
(A) give the agency's file number or other
reference number,
(B) give the name of the proceeding,
(C) designate whether the proceeding is one of
a category to be conducted informally according
to the provisions of rules enacted under Sections
63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, with citation to the applicable rule authonzing that designation, or formally according to Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46bn

>
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(D) m the case of a formal adjudicative proceeding, and where respondent parties are
known, state that a written response must be
filed within 30 days of the date of the agency's
notice if mailed, or within 30 days of the last
publication date of the agency's notice, if published,
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is to be held in an informal
adjudicative proceeding, state the time and place
of any scheduled hearing, the purpose for which
the hearing is to be held, and t h a t a party who
fails to attend or participate in a scheduled and
noticed hearing may be held in default,
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal, and a hearing is required by statute or
rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and may
be requested by a party within the time prescribed by rule, state the parties' right to request
a h e a n n g and the time within which a h e a n n g
may be requested under the agency's rules, and
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and
telephone number of the presiding officer
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions are not
verned by this chapter, but agency and judicial review of
ose initial determinations or actions are subject to the
ovisions of this chapter, the request for agency action
eking review must be filed with the agency within the time
escribed by the agency's rules
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, an
ency may, by rule, provide for a longer response time than
lowed by this section, and may provide for a shorter reonse time if required or permitted by applicable federal law
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or order,
•plications for licenses filed under authority of Title 32A,
lapters 3, Packaging Agencies, 4, Public Liquor License, and
Private Club Liquor* License are not considered to be a
quest for agency action under this chapter
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is to award
license or other privilege as to which there are multiple
mpetmg applicants, the agency may, by rule or order,
nduct a single adjudicative proceeding to determine the
vard of that license or privilege
2001

*-46b-4. Designation of adjudicative proceedings as
informal — Standards — Undesignated proceedings formal.
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjucative proceedings to be conducted informally according to
le procedures set forth in rules enacted under the a u t h o n t y
this chapter if
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not violate
any procedural requirement imposed by a statute other
than this chapter,
(b) in the view of the agency, the n g h t s of the parties to
the proceedings will be reasonably protected by the informal procedures,
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative efficiency will be enhanced by categorizations, and
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings outweighs the potential benefits to the public of a formal
adjudicative proceeding
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all agency
djudicative proceedings not specifically designated as mforlal proceedings by the agency's rules shall be conducted
>rmally in accordance with the requirements of this chapter
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any adjudica-
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mg, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding if
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest, and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly
prejudice the rights of any party
1987

63-46b-5.

Procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings.

(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or more
categories of adjudicative proceedings as informal adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by rule, prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings that include the
following
(a) Unless the agency by rule provides for and requires
a response, no answer or other pleading responsive to the
allegations contained in the notice of agency action or the
request for agency action need be filed
(b) The agency shall hold a h e a n n g if a hearing is
required by statute or rule, or if a h e a n n g is permitted by
rule and is requested b> a party within the time prescribed by rule
(c) In any hearing, the parties named in the notice of
agency action or in the request for agency action shall be
permitted to testify, present evidence, and comment on
the issues
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely notice to all
parties
(e) Discovery is prohibited, but the agency mav issue
subpoenas or other orders to compel production of necessary evidence
(f) All parties shall have access to information contained in the agency's files and to all materials and
information gathered in any investigation, to the extent
permitted by law
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency
may enact rules permitting intervention where a federal
statute or rule requires that a state permit intervention
(h) All h e a n n g s shall be open to all parties
(1) Within a reasonable time after the close of an
informal adjudicative proceeding, the presiding officer
shall issue a signed order in writing that states the
following
(I) the decision,
(II) the reasons for the decision,
(III) a notice of any right of administrative or
judicial review available to the parties, and
(IV) the time limits for filing an appeal or requesting a review
(j) The presiding officer's order shall be based on the
facts appeanng in the agency's files and on the facts
presented in evidence at any h e a n n g s
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall be
promptly mailed to each of the parties
(2) (a) The agency may record any h e a n n g
(b) Any party, at his own expense, may have a reporter
approved by the agency prepare a transcript from the
agency's record of the hearing
(3) Nothing m this section restricts or precludes any investigative n g h t or power given to an agency by another statute.
1988

63-46b-6. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Responsive pleadings.
,
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless modified
by rule according to Subsection 63-46b-3(5), the respondent, w
any, shall file and serve a written response signed by tne

(a) the agency's file number or other reference number,
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding,
(c) a statement of the relief that the respondent seeks,
(d) a statement of the facts, and
(e) a statement summarizing the reasons that the relief
requested should be granted
(2) The respondent shall send a copy of the response filed
under Subsection (1) to each party
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule, may permit
or require pleadings in addition to the notice of agency action,
the request for agency action, and the response All documents
permitted or required to be filed shall be filed with the agency
and one copy shall be sent to each party
2001
63-46b-7.

P r o c e d u r e s for formal adjudicative proceedings — Discovery and subpoenas.
(1) In formal adjudicative proceedings, the agrency may, by
rule, prescnbe means of discovery adequate to permit the
parties to obtain all relevant information necessairy to support
their claims or defenses If the agency does not enact rules
under this section, the parties may conduct discovery according to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the attendance of
witnesses or the production of evidence in formal adjudicative
proceedings shall be issued by the presiding officer when
requested by any party, or may be issued by the presiding
officer on his own motion
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative n g h t or power given to an agency by another statute
1987

63-46b-8.

P r o c e d u r e s for formal adjudicati ve proceedings — Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (11),
in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be
conducted as follows
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the
hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to
afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present
their positions
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the
presiding officer
(I) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious,
(II) shall exclude evidence privileged m the courts
of Utah,
(III) may receive documentary evidence in the form
of a copy or excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all
pertinent portions of the original document,
dv) may take official notice of any facts that could
be judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other proceedings before the
agency, and of technical or scientific facte within the
agency's specialized knowledge
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence
solely because it is hearsay
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the
opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct
cross-examination, and submit rebuttal evidence
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to
the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present
oral or written statements at the h e a n n g
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as
evidence to be considered in reaching a decision on the
m e n t s , shall be given under oath
(g) The h e a n n g shall be recorded at the agency's expense

approved Dy the agency prepare a transcript of the hear
ing, subject to any restrictions that the agenc\ is permit
ted by statute to impose to protect confidential inform a
tion disclosed at the h e a n n g
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from
taking appropnate measures necessary to preserve the integ
n t y of the hearing
i9«8
63-46b-9.

P r o c e d u r e s for formal adjudicative proceedings — Intervention.
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, wntten
petition to intervene in a formal adjudicative proceeding with
the agency The person who wishes to intervene shall mail a
copy of the petition to each party The petition shall include
(a) the agency's file number or other reference numbei
(b) the name of the proceeding,
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the peti
tioner's legal n g h t s or interests are substantially affected
by the formal adjudicative proceeding, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor under any provision of
law, and
(d) a statement of the relief t h a t the petitioner seek >
from the agency
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for interven
tion if the presiding officer determines that
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantialh
affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding, and
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt
conduct of the adjudicative proceedings will not be mate
n a i l / impaired by allowing the intervention
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to inter
vene shall be in writmg and mailed to the petitioner and
each party
(b) An order permitting intervention may impose conditions on the intervenor's participation in the adjudicative proceeding that are necessary for a just, orderly, and
prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceeding
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at
any time after the intervention
2001
63-46b-10.

P r o c e d u r e s for formal adjudicative proc e e d i n g s — Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings
(1) Within a reasonable time after the heanng, or after
the filing of any posthearing documents permitted by the
presiding officer, or within the time required by an\
applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding
officer shall sign and issue an order that includes
(a) a statement of the presiding officer s findings 01
fact based exclusively on the evidence of record in the
adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclu
sions of law,
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding
officer's decision,
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agenc\
(e) a notice of the n g h t to apply for reconsidera
tion,
(f) a notice of any n g h t to administrative or judi
cial review of the order available to aggneved parties
and
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsidera
tion or review
(2) The presiding officer may use the presiding officer s
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence
(3) A finding of fact that was contested may not be
based solely on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is
admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence
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(4) This section does not preclude t h e presiding officer
rom issuing interim orders to
(a) notify the parties of further heanngs,
(b) notify t h e parties of provisional rulings on a
portion of the issues presented, or
(c) otherwise provide for the fair a n d efficient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding
2001
3b-ll. Default
The presiding officer m a y enter a n order of default
1st a part} if
(a) a part} in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails
to participate in t h e adjudicative proceeding,
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to
attend or participate in a properly scheduled hearing
after receiving proper notice, or
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding
fails to file a response under Section 63-46b-6
) An order of default shall include a s t a t e m e n t of t h e
m d s for default a n d shall be mailed to all parties
) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have t h e agency set
aside t h e default order, and any order in t h e adjudicative
proceeding issued subsequent to t h e default order, by
following t h e procedures outlined in t h e U t a h Rules of
Civil Procedure
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any subsequent
order shall be made to t h e presiding officer
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under
Section 63-46b-12, or reconsideration under Section 6346b-13, only on the decision of the presiding officer on the
motion to set aside the default
4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency,
or in an adjudicative proceeding begun by a party t h a t has
other parties besides the party in default, the presiding
officer shall, after issuing the order of default, conduct any
further proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding without the participation of the party in
default and shall determine all issues in the adjudicative
proceeding, including those affecting the defaulting party
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties
other than the agency and the party in default, the
presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of default,
dismiss the proceeding
1988

*-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure.
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to
any adjudicative proceeding to seek review of an order by
the agency or by a superior agency, the aggrieved party
may file a wntten request for review within 30 days after
the issuance of the order with the person or entity
designated for that purpose by the statute or rule
(b) The request shall
(I) be signed by t h e party seeking review,
(II) state t h e grounds for review a n d t h e relief
requested,
(in) state t h e date upon which it was mailed, and
dv) be mailed to t h e presiding officer a n d to each
party
(2) (a) Within 15 days of the mailing d a t e of the request for
review, or within the time period provided by agency rule,
whichever is longer, any party m a y file a response with
the person designated by s t a t u t e or rule to receive t h e
response
(b) The party who files a response under Subsection
(2)(a) shall mail a copy of t h e response to each of t h e
parties a n d to the presiding officer
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an
order by the agenc> or a superior agency, the agency or
supenor agenc> shall review the order within a reasonable
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time or withm the time required b> statute or the agenc\ s
rules
(4) To assist in review, t h e agency or superior agencj ma>
by order or rule permit t h e parties to file briefs or other
documents, or to conduct oral a r g u m e n t
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all
parties
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after t h e filing of any
response, other filings, or oral argument, or within the
time required by s t a t u t e or applicable rules, the agency or
superior agency shall issue a written order on review
(b) T h e order on review shall be signed by t h e agency
head or by a person designated by t h e agency for that
purpose a n d shall be mailed to each party
(c) The order on review shall contain
(I) a designation of the statute or rule permitting
or requiring review,
(II) a statement of the issues reviewed,
(III) findings of fact as to each of t h e issues reviewed,
(IV) conclusions of law a s to each of t h e issues
reviewed,
(v) t h e reasons for t h e disposition,
(vi) w h e t h e r the decision of the presiding officer or
agencv is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified, and
whether all or any portion of t h e adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded,
(vn) a notice of any right of further administrative
reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved parties, a n d
(vm) t h e time limits applicable to a n y appeal or
review
2001
63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration.
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date t h a t a n order is issued
for which review by t h e agency or by a s u p e n o r agency
under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, a n d if the order
would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party
ma> file a w n t t e n request for reconsideration with the
agency, stating t h e specific grounds upon which relief is
requested
(b) Unless otherwise provided by s t a t u t e , t h e filing of
the request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial
review of the order
(2) T h e request for reconsideration shall be filed with the
agency a n d one copy shall be mailed to each party by the
person making the request
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that
purpose, shall issue a wntten order granting the request
or denying the request
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that
purpose does not issue an order within 20 days after the
filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall
be considered to be denied
2001
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
( D A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final
agency action, except in actions where judicial review is
expressly prohibited by statute
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting
all administrative remedies available, except that
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust
administrative remedies if this chapter or any other
statute states that exhaustion is not required,
*
(b) t h e court m a y relieve a party seeking judicial re*
view of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if
*
(1) t h e administrative remedies a r e inadequate, 0
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63-46b-17

appropriate appellate court in the form required b\ t h a
appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate
court shall govern all additional filings and proceedings in
the appellate court
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agencv *,
record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings
are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except
that
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate
to shorten, summarize, or organize the record,
(b) the appellate court may tax t h e cost of preparing
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative
transcripts and copies for the record
proceedings.
(I) against a party who unreasonably refuses to
(1) (a) The district courts have jurisdiction to review by
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from
record, or
informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juve(II) according to any other provision of law
nile courts have jurisdiction over all state agency actions
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis
relating to
of t h e agency's record, it determines that a person seeking
d) the removal or placement of children in state
judicial review h a s been substantially prejudiced by any of the
custody,
(u) the support of children under Subsection following
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which
(D(aXi) as determined administratively under Secthe agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face
tion 78-3a-906, and
or as applied,
(in) substantiated findings of abuse or neglect
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conmade by the Division of Child and Family Services,
ferred by any statute,
after an evidentiary hearing
(c) the agency h a s not decided all of the issues requir(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative
ing resolution,
proceedings shall be as provided in the statute governing
(d) the agency h a s erroneously interpreted or applied
the agency or, in the absence of such a venue provision, in
the law,
the county where the petitioner resides or maintains the
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
petitioner's principal place of business
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudiprocedure,
cative proceedings shall be a complaint governed by the
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall include
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
d) t h e name and mailing address of the party
disqualification,
seeking judicial review,
(n) t h e name and mailing address of the respon(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of
dent agency,
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported
(m) the title and date of the final agency action to
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
be reviewed, together with a copy, summary, or brief
record before the court,
descnption of the agency action,
(h) the agency action is
(IV) identification of the persons who were parties
(I) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the
in t h e informal adjudicative proceedings that led to
agency by statute,
the agency action,
(II) contrary to a rule of the agency,
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the
(III) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless
informal proceeding;
the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts
(vi) facts demonstrating that the p a r t / seeking
and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational
judicial review is entitled to obtain judicial review,
basis for the inconsistency, or
(vn) a request for relief, specifying the type and
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious
1988
extent of relief requested, and
(vin) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner 63-46b-17. J u d i c i a l r e v i e w — T y p e of relief.
is entitled to relief
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative pro(b) All additional pleadings and proceedmgs in the
ceedings by the distnct court or the review of formal
district court are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil
adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court
Procedure
may award damages or compensation only to the extent
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all
expressly authorized by statute
questions of fact and law and any constitutional issue
(b) In granting relief, the court may
presented in the pleadings
(I) order agency action required by law,
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial pro(II) order the agency to exercise its discretion as
ceedings under this section
2001
required by law,
(in) set aside or modify agency action,
63-46b-16. J u d i c i a l r e v i e w — Formal a d j u d i c a t i v e p r o (iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agenc>
ceedings.
action, or
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further
of Appeals h a s jurisdiction to review all final agency action
proceedings
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized by
shall file a petition for review of agency action with the statute
1987
(u) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit
derived from requiring exhaustion
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final
agency action within 30 days after the date that the order
constituting the final agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b13(3)(b)
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other
appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet t h e
form requirements specified in this chapter
1988
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6b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other temporary remedies pending final disposition.
) Unless precluded by another statute, the agenc> may
it a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the
iency of judicial review, according to the agency's rules
) Parties shall petition the agenc> for a stay or other
porary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances ree immediate judicial intervention
) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary
edies requested by a party, the agency's order of denial
[1 be mailed to all parties and shall specify the reasons why
stay or other temporary remedy was not granted
) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary
edy to protect the public health, safet>, or welfare against
lbstantial threat, the court ma> not grant a stay or other
porary remedy unless it finds that
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the
stay, or

(c) Except to the extent expressl} authonzed b\ statute, a complaint seeking civil enforcement of an agencv's
order ma\ not request, and the court ma\ not grant anv
monetary payment apart from taxable costs
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agenc>'s
order, in addition to any other defenses allowed by law, a
defendant ma> defend on the ground that
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued by an
agency without jurisdiction to issue the order,
(b) the order does not apply to the defendant,
(c) the defendant has not violated the order, or
(d) the defendant violated the order but has subsequently complied

(b) (1) the party seeking judicial review is likely to
prevail on the merits when the court finally disposes
of the matter,
(n) the party seeking judicial review will suffer
irreparable injury without immediate relief,
(in) granting relief to the party seekmg review will
not substantially harm other parties to the proceedings, and
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, or welfare relied upon by the agency is not sufficiently
senous to justify the agency's action under the circumstances
1987

(1) An agency may issue an order on an emergency basis
without complying with the requirements of this chapter if
(a) the facts known by the agency or presented to the
agency show that an immediate and significant danger to
the public health, safety, or welfare exists, and
(b) the threat requires immediate action by the agency
(2) In issuing its emergency order, the agency shall
(a) limit its order to require only the action necessary
to prevent or avoid the danger to the public health, safety,
or welfare,
(b) issue promptly a written order, effective immediately, that includes a bnef statement of findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and reasons for the agency's utilization
of emergency adjudicative proceedings, and
(c) give immediate notice to the persons who are required to comply with the order

46b-19. Civil e n f o r c e m e n t .
1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by law, an
agency may seek enforcement of an order by seeking civil
enforcement in the district courts

(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an agency's
order must name, as defendants, each alleged violator
against whom the agency seeks to obtain civil enforcement
(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforcement of an
agency's order shall be determined by the requirements of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(d) The action may request, and the court may grant,
any of the following
d) declaratory relief,
(n) temporary or permanent injunctive relief,
(m) any other civil remedy provided by law, or
(iv) any combination of the foregoing
(2) (a) Any person whose interests are directly impaired or
threatened by the failure of an agency to enforce an
agency's order may timely file a complaint seeking civil
enforcement of that order, but the action may not be
commenced
d) until at least 30 days after the plaintiff has
given notice of his intent to seek civil enforcement of
the alleged violation to the agency head, the attorney
general, and to each alleged violator against whom
the petitioner seeks civil enforcement,
(n) if the agency has filed and is diligently prosecuting a complaint seeking civil enforcement of the
same order against the same or a similarly situated
defendant, or
(m) if a petition for judicial review of the same
order has been filed and is pending in court
(b) The complaint seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order must name, as defendants, the agency whose
order is sought to be enforced, the agency that is vested
with the power to enforce the order, and each alleged
violator against whom the plaintiff seeks civil enforcement

(4) Decisions on complaints seeking civil enforcement of an
agency's order are reviewable in the same manner as other
civil cases
1987
63-46b-20.

E m e r g e n c y adjudicative p r o c e e d i n g s .

(3) If the emergency order issued under this section will
result in the continued infringement or impairment of any
legal right or interest of any party, the agency shall commence
a formal adjudicative proceeding in accordance with the other
provisions of this chapter
1987

63-46b-21. Declaratory orders.
(1) Any person may file a request for agency action, requesting that the agency issue a declaratory order determining the
applicability of a statute, rule, or order within the primary
jurisdiction of the agency to specified circumstances
(2) Each agency shall issue rules that
(a) provide for the form, contents, and filing of petitions
for declaratory orders,
(b) provide for the disposition of the petitions,
(c) define the classes of circumstances in which the
agency will not issue a declaratory order,
(d) are consistent with the public interest and with the
general policy of this chapter, and
(e) facilitate and encourage agency issuance of reliable
advice
(3) (a) An agency may not issue a declaratory order if
d) the request is one of a class of circumstances
that the agency has by rule defined as being exempt
from declaratory orders, or
(n) the person requesting the declaratory order
participated in an adjudicative proceeding concerning
the same issue within 12 months of the date of the
present request
(b) An agency may issue a declaratory order that would
substantially prejudice the nghts of a person who would
be a necessary party, only if that person consents in
writing to the determination of the matter by a declaratory proceeding
(4) Persons may intervene in declaratory proceedings if

1
R708-14-6. Commencement of Adjudicative Proceedings.
(1) In accordance with Subsection 63-46b-3(l), alcohol/drug adjudicative proceedings may
be commenced by:
(a) a notice of division action, if the proceedings are commenced by the division; or
(b) a request for division action, if the proceedings are commenced by a person other than
the division.
(2) A notice of division action and request for division action shall include the information
set forth in Subsections 63-46b-3(2)(a) and (3)(a) respectively. In addition, a request for division
action shall include the petitioner's full name, date of birth, and the date of arrest or occurrence
which prompted the request for division action. A request for division action that is not made
timely, in accordance with Subsections 53-3-223(6)(a), 53-3-23l(7)(a)(ii), and 53-3-418(9)(b),
will not be granted except for good cause as determined by the division.
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HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE PRESIDING
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

This is the time set for hearing in the

matter of Michael Hess versus G. Barton Blackstock, the
Driver's License Division. And the Petitioner is present and
represented by Mr. Oliver.

The Respondent is present and

represented by Ms. Waldron.
Is the Driver's License Division ready to proceed,
Ms. Waldron?
MS. WALDRON:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
You may call your first witness.

MS. WALDRON:

Your Honor, I believe counsel has

basically a legal issue that he wants to argue regarding this
case, regarding the initiation of the administrative
proceedings and he will, we're going to stipulate to the fact
that the officer served the petitioner a copy of the summons
and citation which I'd like to be marked as Exhibit 1 and
that's how the Driver's License Division initiated this
proceedings, and depending on the outcome of his argument,
Counsel will stipulate to the PC to arrest, admonitions were
read and the results of the breath test which was a .23. So
he's stipulating to all the factual basis needed other than
this legal issue of what's the correct way to initiate these
driver's license proceedings.

MR. OLIVER:

We lust have a brief argument on that if

that's okay with the Court.
THE COURT:

You may.

Is that the agreement then Mr.

Oliver?
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
So basically you are stipulating to all

the factual basis necessary to justify the revocation with the
exception of the manner in which it was initiated, is that your
stipulation?
I

MR. OLIVER:

!

THE COURT:

Yes.

That's our -

The legal question before the Court is

| the propriety of the initiation of the proceedings;
1

I

is that

correct?
MR. OLIVER:

That's correct.

MS. WALDRON:

Exactly.

!

THE COURT:

All right.

I

MS. WALDRON:

You may speak to that then.

I will have to respond after counsel

<

• makes his argument but it's our position that the case law and
| the statutes requires that the initiation of these driver's

|

| license proceedings is the service by the officer on the

|

I petitioner, a copy of the DUI Summons and Citation, the bottom |
of which give the individual the notice of the Driver's License I
I
intent to deny, suspend or revoke or disqualify. It would also |
list the individual's right to a hearing.

He can request a

hearing within ten days and the procedure to go about getting

I

I
|

2I

1

the hearing, we're relying on, number one, 53-3-223 that

2

basically explains that once an individual is arrested, the

3

!

4

officer shall serve a notice on behalf of the division and subsection three lists what needs to be in that notice and would

5 I you go further down 223, it further goes on about upon a
1

i
|
!

6 ! written request Division shall grant a person an opportunity to'
7 | be heard within 29 days and kind of goes down and explains what '
8 I needs to be in the hearing.
I
9 |

Additionally, the case of Mavis vs Blackstock, which I

10 ' is a 1999 case, 94 P Second 1272, which I do have a copy of it |
11

for Your Honor, states that this case was regarding what was

12 | initiating event for these Driver's License hearings and they
i

i

13 | ruled that it is the service of the notice of intent to

'

I

'

i

i

14 | suspend, revoke, or disqualify.

Specifically, it says that the I

15 i Driver's License Division must show that this notice was

i
l

16 ' served.
i

17 |

Counsel is pulling up the Administrative Procedures

|
t

18

Act.

I don't know exactly what section, and is claiming that

i

|
i

19 ' this notice does not contain what's necessary to start an

j
i

20 | informal administrative procedure.

Without being more specific]

21

to those sections, since I don't have the book in front of me

22

and he just informed me of what his argument was, that since

23

53-3-223 is specific on what is required to start these

I

|
I
hearings, to start the administrative process and the fact that|

24

I

25
!

we have Mavis vs Blackstock interpreting what is required that I
3 I

1

whatever the difference is, the 53-3-223 and Mavis vs

2 i Blackstock is controlling.

I'll do further argument after I

3 I hear from counsel.
4 I

THE COURT:

Mr. Oliver?

i

5 I

MR. OLIVER:

Your Honor, just one thing that I wish

6 I to clear up by way of setting our facts down.
7

In our Petition

for Judicial Review, we refer to this particular issue, at

8 I least, let's see one, two, three, four, four times in our
9 I petition.

We refer to it once in Paragraph 12 of the petition,

i
i

10 | once in Paragraph 18, once in Paragraph 19, once in Paragraph
11 I 20 and so in those four paragraphs, actually and there's also
i

12 I Paragraph 32 refers to it and so, we actually refer to this
i

13 | particular provision at least five times in our petition.

So

i

14 I it's not like this is something I'm raising the first time
i

15 , today.

This is actually one of our causes of action that we

16 , have pled before this Court.
17 |

It's our position that in the code book, 41-6-44.1,

18 I now 41-6-44

is the DUI section in Utah Code.

19 I procedures for adjudicative proceedings.

41-6-44.1 is the

This driver's license

20 | hearing is an adjudicative proceedings, but the procedures
21

state in 41-6-44.1 says "The Department of Public Safety shall

22

comply with the procedures and requirements of Title 63 Chapter

23

4 6B in it's adjudicative proceedings."

24

look and we see what 63-46B refers to, what it refers to, Your

25

Honor, is, we'll start off with Paragraph 3 as we have pled in

Then when we take a

4

i

our petition.

It says, "Commencement of adjudicative

2

proceedings'' and it says, "except as otherwise permitted m 63-

3

46-B20" and that's emergency procedures and there's some very

4 I specific things that have to happen and be shown for that
5 i exception to take place.
6 I not problem with that.

The Court can refer to that.

I have

"All adjudicative proceedings shall be

7 | commenced by either" and it gives you two alternatives, "Notice
of agency action if proceedings are commenced by the agency, or
a request for agency action if proceedings are commenced by

9
10

persons other than the agency."

So we have two ways to begin I

11

an administrative proceeding with the agency.

12
13

agency begins it and it's the agency that initiating it and the I
I
other is a request from a third person requesting the agency to

14

take action.

One is that the

Now, then it goes on to state in Sub-Paragraph 2, it

15

says, "A notice of agency action shall be filed and served

16

17 I according to the following requirements."

Shall mandatory.

i
i

18 t "The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a
19 j presiding officer."

Well, Exhibit 1 has not been moved or

20 I admitted but I think the stipulation is that it will be because
21
we're indicating procedures (inaudible) accordingly. I'd move
22

to admit Exhibit 1.

23

MS. WALDRON:

No objection.

24

THE COURT:

Is that Exhibit 1?

25

MR. OLIVER:

That's correct.

'
,

THE COURT:

All right.

One is received.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 received)
MR. OLIVER:

Exhibit 1, if the Court will review

that, at no place is it signed by a presiding officer and then
it says, "and shall include the names and mailing addresses of
all persons to whom the notice is being given by the presiding
officer and the name, title, and mailing address of any
attorney or employee who has been designated to appear for the
agency."

We have the name of the individual arrested but we

have nothing else and again, it's not being mailed by the
presiding officer.
number."

"Agency's file number or other reference

That may or may not be there if we consider the

driver's licence number to be the file or reference number, so
be it.

I'm not sure that's crucial,.

The name of the

adjudicative proceeding, that is not there.
notice of agency action was mailed.

The date that the

It wasn't mailed.

Statement of whether the adjudicative proceedings is to be
conducted informally according to the provisions of the rule
adopted under 63-46B4 and 63-46B5 or formally according to the
provisions of section 63-46B6 to 63-46B11.

That's not there.

It's not indicating whether it's going to be informal or formal
and that's a requirement.

"If the adjudicative proceedings is

be formal," it is not so we'll move on from that.

"If the

adjudicative proceedings to be" again, that's formal.
not worry about that one.

We'll

That's 6 and 7 of the sub-section

there.

"If the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a

hearing is required by statute or rule or if a hearing is
permitted by rule and may be requested by a party within a time
prescribed by rule, a statement that the parties may request a
hearing within the time provided by the agency's rules." One
could argue that that provision is there except that this is

|

not being an initiated by the agency, this is rather being
initiated on a citation by the officer who is not an employee

l

of the agency.

j

"Statement of the legal authority and

jurisdiction under which the adjudicative proceeding is to be
maintained."

The name and title.

"The name, title, mailing

address and telephone number of the presiding officer." That's1
not there.

"A statement of the purpose of the adjudicative

proceeding and to the extent known by the presiding officer,
the questions to be decided."

'
i

One could argue that the purpose

of the proceeding is contained there but not the questions to

|

be decided.

j

Okay?

And then it goes on to state, "When

adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the

|

agency shall" -

I

THE COURT:

Mr. Oliver, look, the whole issue is

|
i
whether or not this is an emergency proceeding or not isn't it?j
i

MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

No.
Isn't that the whole issue before the

I
I

matter that allows him to short circuit the procedure —
MR. OLIVER:

I'll go to that and I'll read the 20

|

i
i

7!

1

because —

2

THE COURT:

Yeah, I think that's the issue.

The

3

question is if it isn't and they're required to go the route

4

designated by the Administrative Procedures Act, it certainly

5

doesn't qualify.

6

MR. OLIVER:

And then I'll go onto 20 and I'll

7

address Section 20 which is the Emergency Adjudicative

8

Proceedings which it does not comply with this either.

9

agency may issue an order" now, this is the agency issuing an

"An

10

order not commencing an action; but it says, "An agency may

11

issue an order on an emergency basis without complying with the

12

requirements of this chapter if (a) the facts known by the

13

agency..."

When this citation is issued, there's no facts

14 I known by the agency at that time.

"Or presented to the agency

15

show then an immediate and significant danger to the public

16

health, safety or welfare exists."

17

is under the influence of alcohol that they present a danger to

18

the public health or safety.

19

particular case, the problem that we have is the notice comes

One could argue that if one

I understand that, but in this

20 i and it doesn't take emergency action by the agency.

What it

21 ' does is it says, you're granted a temporary license for up to
22 i 30 days.
23 I
THE COURT: But isn't the emergency action the taking
I
24 I of his regular driving privileges?
25 I
MR. OLIVER: No, because then the hearing is held at
8

his request. But I'll move on —
THE COURT:

But doesn't the action of the officer,

deprive him or his regular driving privilege?
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

No.
And he has a right within 30 days to a

hearing or it's going to be for 90 days.
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:

Or a year, whatever the case may be.
Or a year or whatever.
But, no, it doesn't deprive him of that

because he's still allowed his regular driving, as a matter of
fact that night —
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

Well, butThe night that he's arrested - the point is, not that.

The point is

regular driving privileges are gone unless he takes an appeal
within 30 days and they find that it's not appropriate.
that right?

Isn't

Isn't that what happens?

MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

No.
They're essentially depriving him of his

driving privileges, aren't they?
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:

No.
Sure they are.
No. As a matter of fact, if the

citation is not sent to the department —
THE COURT:

I realize there's procedures to follow

but I'm saying if they follow the procedures, his license is
gone.

His regular driving privileges are gone after 30 days;

isn't that right?
MR. OLIVER:

Well, that's assuming that the facts are

there to substantiate it.
THE COURT:

Well, sure it's assuming that.

MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:
emergency action.

Okay.
But I'm saying, they're taking some

They're saying Mr. Oliver, you can drive for

30 days, but your regular driver's license is gone unless you
in fact, make an application within 30 days and we decide
something else.
MR. OLIVER:

Okay.

Let me go on and finish reading

the provisions.

Okay.

"The threat requires immediate action

by the agency."

Okay, now, I think that if we're going to

argue that indeed the agency is using the emergency procedures,
if that's what we're going to argue, then my position would be
that the threat is then and there at that time, not 30 days
hence.

That indeed the driver should be taken off the road

immediately and not allowed to return to the road but indeed
what we say is no, we're going to take you off the road now.
But even right now, I'm arresting you for DUI, but even right
now, you still have the right to drive.
THE COURT:

It's not an emergency, you can drive for

another 30 days.
10

1

MR. OLIVER:

That's correct, yes.

2 ,

But it goes on, "In issuing its emergency order, the

3

agency shall" which they didn't issue this, "In issuing its

4

emergency order, the agency shall limit its order to require

5

only the action necessary to prevent or avoid the danger to

6 i public health, safety, or welfare."

That's not what they're

7

doing.

They're not saying don't drive while you've been

8

drinking which would be the emergency that the Court is

9 - referring to. What they're saying is you're not going to be
10 ' able to drive at all and that doesn't address the emergency.
11 i It addresses a punishment or a sanction.

I'm not trying to use

12 I the wrong word and please, let's not get hung up on double
13 , jeopardy.

I'm not going there.

That has nothing to do with

14 i this case so if I use a word that the Court feels uncomfortable
15

with, that's not what I'm after.

16 '

THE COURT:

17

MR. OLIVER:

I'm not concerned with that.
And I apologize in advance because this

18 i has nothing to do with the other side of the case, Your Honor.
19 ' Not even remotely.
20 |

So, what they're doing is they're saying under any

!

21 I circumstances you can't drive.

They're not just limiting it to

i

22 I the emergency or to the danger or to the public safety.
23

They're just saying no, this is a sanction that we're placing

24

on you and that's where it sits.

Okay.

So that's violated.

25 J Then B, "Issue promptly a written order effective immediately'
11

1

right then, "that includes a brief statement of findings of

2

fact, conclusions of law and reasons for the agency's

3

utilization of emergency adjudicative proceedings."

4 ' done.

Never

There's nothing in anything that Mr. Hess has received

5 | from the Driver's License Division that even comes close to

i
6 | that or even a suggestion that the agency is using it's
7 I emergency proceedings power.

"Give immediate notice to the

8 i persons who are required to comply with the order.

If the

9 I emergency order issued under this section will result in a
10

continued infringement or impairment or any legal right or

11 i interest or any party, the agency shall commence a formal
12 | adjudicative proceeding in accordance with the other provisions
!
I

13 ! of this chapter."
14 I not formal.

They don't.

They have informal proceedings,

So that provision is not even complied with by the

15 | department.
i
i

16 •

So if we look at it under 20, I was not summarily

17 | brushing 20 aside; but if we look at it under 20, they still
18 ! haven't complied with that.

They don't even come close to it.

19 I They don't even make an effort to make it look it like they're
And so overall, all the way from a formal
21
20 { complying under 20.
adjudicative proceedings, an informal adjudicative proceedings
22
23

but the requirement is that they comply with 63-46B, you walk

24

by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and that's what has

25

to happen.

They didn't do it and so we've pled it.

This does

1

not come as a surprise to counsel.

We've pled it. We've pled

2

it very plainly and very clearly and it's our position that the

3 I agency action was commenced inappropriately, not according to
4 i statute, not according to authority.

!

And the case cited by the |

5 ! State, I appreciate that, that wasn't the question.

The

|

i
6

\

question that is here and whether or not they followed the

7 : adjudicative proceedings as outlined in 63-46B, which is

|

8 i required to be followed under the DUI statute, if indeed - and
9 | that wasn't the issue that was raised in that case. We're
10 ! raising very specific issues and we're saying no, if you're
11 i going to commence an agency action, we'll say there's one of
12 I three.

You either begin it under the emergency procedures

13 | which they did not do.

They didn't have a formal adjudicative

14 | proceeding in this matter; or the agency has to commence it and
15 | there's specific requirements; or it has to be at the request
16 • of a third party and then again, the statute defines what is
17 i required when there's a request for agency action by a third
18 i person.
19

!

We actually believe, though I can't speak for the

agency, we actually believe that's the method under which

20 i they're commencing the action and that's contained within
i

21 J 63-46B3.

The provision is there for when the adjudicative

22 I proceedings are to be commenced by a person other than the
23 | agency, and they're not complied with either.
24 I
25

So it's our position that whether it's the agency
commencing it, somebody else requesting agency action or the

i

i

13

emergency powers, at no point has the agency complied with
their requirements to begin the administrative proceedings.
Therefore, we believe that the administrative proceedings were
commenced inappropriately and we would ask this Court to set
the agency's action aside.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Ms. Waldron, would you like to respond?
MS. WALDRON:

Just briefly.

Where counsel was

reading regarding the requirements of the mailing address of
the individual you're mailing it to and all that, does not
apply here since the requirement is the individual gets
personally served by the police officer which is - the
requirements of the mailing and all the address is to verify
that they were mailed to the correct address and to show
service.

In this case, it's personal service and it's usually

shown by the testimony of the police officers.
And also, Your Honor, the statute that counsel was
reading, not only covered the commencement but regarding what's
required at the hearing.
THE COURT:
MS. WALDRON:

What was the section again?

63-46B, Sub-Section 3.
I mean, here, the notice is in writing

and according to - it's not signed by the presiding officer
because the Driver's License Division, pursuant to statute, has
given their okay for the police officers to personally serve
the notice of intent on their behalf which is also stated in
1

Mavis as the correct procedure to do.
All these other items that counsel has - the agency's
file number, etc., etc., I don't think that since the Driver's
License Division has a specific statute, 53-3-23 that lists out
the requirements to initiate the suspension - the driver's
license suspension is for the public safety.

It might not come

under the Emergency Revocation Act where there's a separate
action for that where you can revoke
a hearing.

someone's license without

In this case, even in Mavis, it says that in

analyzing these driver's license proceedings, it says "The
purpose of the entire drunken driving statutory scheme is to
expeditiously remove drunken drivers from Utah's roads, thus
time is of the essence in the statutory scheme when considered
as a whole and substantial rights could depend on the
compliance with the requirement," which they're talking about
the service of the immediate notice and the basic information.
No where has there been a case stating that 53-3-23 is not
appropriate when it's compared to the Administrative Procedures
Act and it is our position that we've complied with 53-3-223
and have initiated the action with the service of the notice
and intent to suspend or revoke, and I'll submit it.
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:

Anything further Mr. Oliver?
Nothing further.

I'd just refresh the

Court's recollection that 41-6-44, indicates that the
administrative and adjudicative proceedings are to be followed

15

under the Administrative Procedure Act and that's what it says.
It states specifically, 63-46B, the requirement is there.

We

believe that that creates a due process position.
THE COURT:

,
|

The Court will take the matter under

i

advisement.

I would like a copy of that Mavis case if you have,

that there.

j

MS. WALDRON:
THE COURT:

You can have my copy, Your Honor.

|

Do either of you have any desire to

I

submit any memorandums on it or do you just want me to take a

|

look at your arguments and rule from there?

'

MR. OLIVER:
desires.

I'd be happy to submit one if the Court I

If not I'll just leave it to the Court.
THE COURT:

Ms. Waldron, what's your desire?

MS. WALDRON:

Leave it to the Court, Your Honor.

I

!

think all the statues are there.
THE COURT:

All right.

We'll review what your

arguments are and I'll make a ruling and notify you m writing.
MS. WALDRON:
THE COURT:

Thank you very much, Your Honor.
Thank you for appearing.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

i
j
I
|
i

i

(C)
16
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CERTIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HASBEEN M E C T ^ T ^ W ^ P f l S THE PROPER
COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-19, UC A
/*7
4L ~' st V*
^
±BADGE
NO
OFFICER.
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DATE SENT TO DLD
DOCKET NO
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DEFENDANT COPY
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READ CAREFULLY

^nation is not an information and will not be used as an information without your consent If an information is filed you will be provided a copy by the court
MUST appear m court on or before the time set in this citaton IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A
IRANT FOR YOUR ARREST

NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY, SUSPEND, REVOKE, OR DISQUALIFY
ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT THIRTY (30) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE IN THE STATE OF UTAH WILL BE
/

(ARREST UNDER 41-6-44 OR 41-6-44 6 UCA) suspended pursuant to 53-3-223 UCA for ninety (90) days for a first offense or for one (1) year for subsequent
offenses In addition, commercial dnvers in commercial vehicles, your commercial pnvilege will be disqualified for one (1) year for a first offense and a
minimum of ten (10) years for a subsequent offense
ARREST UNDER 32A-12-209 UCA - UNDER 21 YEARS QfJ&GE) denied pursuant to 53-3-231 UCA for ninety (90) days for a first offense, or suspended for
one (1) year for a subsequent offense within three*<3) years, or Uenied for one (1) year or until age seventeen (17), whichever is longer, if you have not
been issued an onginal operator license COMPLETION OF AUTHORIZED SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAM REQUIRED FOR REINSTATEMENT

(REFUSAL TO SUBMIT UNDER 41-6-44 10 UCA) fflfflteZ foreighteen (18) months for a first refusal to submit to a chemical test or for twenty-four (24) months if it is a
second or subsequent license withdrawal for an alcohol or drug related dnving offense
(COMMERCIAL DISQUALIFICATION53-3-418 UCA) disqualified, for dnving a commercial vehicle, pursuant to 53-3-414 UCA for one (1) year for a first offense
and a minimum of ten (10) yearafcr subsequent offense If you refuse the chemical test the same sanctions apply
IT TO HEARING: A charge of dnvmg^ftder the influence is a violation of both the criminal code (handled by the court) and the civil administrative code (handled by J\\\
r License Division) In order to keefeJrfving privilege, you must prevail both before the court and the Dnver License Division Separately The Dnver License Division will grantl
in opportunity for a civil administrative heanng, upon receiving a written request within 10 calendar days of arrest Send request to Dnver License Division, PO Box 30560,
-ake City, Utah 84130-0560 (attn DUI Section) Failure to properly request a heanng or to appear for a heanng, may result in loss of dnving privilege A criminal conviction cf
from court) or an adverse administrative determination (from Dnver License Division) will result in loss of dnving pnvilege
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on for not issuing temporary license

as a temporary license for up to thirty (36) days from the date of this notice
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REBECCA D. WALDRON (6148)
Assistant Attorney General •
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
P.O.BoxK0857
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801)366-0353

FILED
SE? • 5 2001
'"' ' SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL C W. HESS,

FINDINGS OF .PACT CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

Petitioner,
vs.

G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau
Chief, DAVID A. BEACH, Director,
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION,

Case No. 010700131 AA
Judge Rodney S. Page

Respondent.

The above-entitled maner came before the Court for a trial dc novo on May 8,2001, the
Honorable Rodney S.fage presiding. The Petitioner and his counsel, D. Bruce Oliver appeared.
Respondent appeared through counsel Rebecca D. Waldron, Assistant Attorney General. The
Parties stipulated that the Plaintiff was served with a copy of the citation at the time of arrest
along with a notice of Division's intent to revoke his driver's license and information on his right

to a hearing before the revocation becomes effective. Parties further stipulated that the only issue
before the Court was whether the procedure authorized by Sectiorv 53-3-223 UCA, (1953, as
amended) violated Administrative Procedures Act and denied Plaintiff due process. The Court,
having heard and considered the evidence, stipulations of the parties and arguments presented at
the hearing, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On January 27, 2001, Petitioner was arrested for violation section 41-6-44 UCA
(1953, as amended).
2

The arresting officer served Petitioner with a copy of the DUI Summons and Citation

which included the Driver License Division's notice of their intent to suspend or revoke
Petitioner's driving privilege and his right to a hearing before the revocation becomes effective:
3. Petitioner's license was suspended for one year effective February 26, 2001 based on a
second or subsequent driving under the influence arrest.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
L Section 53-3-223 of the Driver's License Act allows an officer to confiscate the
driver's license of one suspected for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs The section
allows the officer to issue the suspect a temporary license good for 30 days and 10 give the
suspect notice that his driver's license will be suspended beginning 30 days from the date of the
*>

citation providing information on his right to a hearing before the revocation period starts.
2: The Administrative Procedures Act sets up regulations governing procedures that
must be followed prior to an agency taking certain action. Section 63-46(b)-0.5 et seq. UCA
(1953. as amended).
3. Section 63-46(b)-3 sets forth how agency adjudicative procedures must be followed.
Section exempts those kinds of administrative procedures that are permitted pursuant to Section
63«46(b>20oftheact.
4. Section 63-46(b)-20 provides for emergency adjudicative proceedings and states that
an agency may issue an order without complying with the requirements of the chapter if the facts
known by the agency or presented to the agency show that an immediate and significant danger
to the public health, safety or welfare exists and that the threat requires immediate action by the
agency. It also provides for certain limitations on any order issued by the agency in those
circumstances.
5. The procedures set up by Section 53-3-223 are designed to limit the driving privileges
of those suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and to remove them from
the highway as quickly as possible without waiting for the regular judicial process. There is an
immediate danger posed to the public and society by those who drive while impaired by drugs or
alcohol.
6. The Court concludes that the procedures set up by Section 53-3-223 are in the nature

3
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cf emergency actions and are therefore exempt form the requirements of 63-46(b)o. The
procedures comply with the requirements of 63-46(b>20(2) in that notice and citation provides
facts and statements sufficient to provided the basis for using the emergency procedures and it is
signed by the police officer. It provides notice to the defendant and an opportunity for heanng
before the effective date of the revocation
7 Tae procedures set forth in Section 53-3-223 UCA (1953, as amended) do not violate
the Administrative Procedures Act and do not infringe on Plaintiffs rights of due process

ORDER
IT IS HEREY ORDERED1. Petitioner's Petition seeking the return of his license is denied.
2. The February 20, 2001, suspension of Petitioner's driving privilege for a period one
year effective Februaiy 26,2001 is affirmed.
Dated this 2Z_ day of

Ay^

t

2001.

BY THE COURT.

Honorable i^ocjney S Page
District Court Judge
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